Public listing is a key reform measure for large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. We find evidence that public listing lowers state ownership significantly, lessens firms' reliance on debt finance, and allows firms to increase capital expenditure, at least temporarily. We also find that ownership structure affects post-listing performance. However, we find no statistical evidence of a positive effect of public listing on firms' profitability. We suggest alternative interpretations of the last finding.
Introduction
Unlike most formerly socialist countries, China until recently avoided privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and instead sought to reform them through piecemeal measures, such as by increasing managers' decision-making autonomy, introducing financial incentives, and bringing in performance contracts between the government and SOEs (Naughton, 1995; Shirley and Xu, 2001 ). These reform measures were accompanied by improved productivity of SOEs during the 1980s (Groves et al., 1994; Jefferson, Rawski, and Zheng, 1994; Zhuang and Xu, 1996; Li, 1997; Xu, 2000) . However, the performance of Chinese state industry has since deteriorated (Lardy, 1998) . In the early 1990s the Chinese government began to shift the focus of SOE reform to privatization of small SOEs and corporatization of larger ones (Cao, Qian and Weingast, 1999; Lin and Zhu, 2001 ).
Public listing of SOEs in the domestic stock exchanges is a key measure of corporatization. Indeed, the vast majority of China's publicly listed companies are formerly state-owned or state-controlled firms, mostly large and better-performing ones. 1 SOEs' low efficiencies are often attributed to a lack of managerial autonomy, soft budget constraints and the agency-incentive problem (Groves et al., 1994; Qian, 1996; Qian and Roland, 1996) . In theory, public listing can potentially help separate government from enterprises and hence increase enterprise autonomy and harden 1 Our data set, to be described later, does not contain information about the types of the share-issuing firms. Based on our interviews with officials of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), about 75% of listed companies are formerly state-owned. Another 10% are formerly shareholding companies with a significant portion of shares held by SOEs. Only less than 10% of listed companies are formerly private-owned firms or foreign-invested firms, which in most cases had SOEs as their joint venture partners.
budget constraints. It may improve managerial incentives if it results in a more clearly defined structure of rights and responsibilities and the involvement of shareholders with incentives and the ability to monitor managers. Public listing should also help to raise capital for SOEs and thus reduce their traditionally high debt-to-asset ratios.
In this research, we explore the extent to which public listing has contributed to the reform of SOEs, paying particular attention to its impact on firms' operating performance and financial structure. Using a panel of pre-and post-listing data of all Chinese companies listed on the two domestic stock exchanges between 1994 and 2000, we find evidence that public listing lowers state ownership significantly, lessens firms' reliance on debt finance, and allows firms to increase capital expenditure, at least temporarily. We also find that the ownership structure affects post-listing performance. However, we find no statistical evidence of public listing exercising a positive effect on firms' profitability. Specifically, firms' operating performances after listing are significantly lower than their pre-listing level. We suggest alternative interpretations of this result.
A number of recent papers have studied publicly-listed Chinese firms. Xu and Wang (1998) and B shares (the former are issued to domestic investors, and the latter to foreign investors). However, neither do they address the issue of how public listing affects company performance. Aharony, Lee and Wong (2000) use the decline in performance to demonstrate the existence of financial packaging in Chinese IPOs that issue shares to foreigners.
In a paper that is more closely related to ours, Sun and Tong (2003) study the effects of public listing on several measures of firm performance in China. Our study differs from theirs in a number of respects. First, our study covers a longer time period. Second, they do not control for the overall trend of the financial performance in the country's state-owned sector, and thus they cannot distinguish intrinsic listing effects from the overall economic downturn in the 1990s for the state sector. Third,
we also look at the effects of ownership structure on firm performance. Fourth, they do not explicitly control for the possibility of financial packaging. Finally, they draw some of the conclusions on listing effects based on the levels (instead of ratios) of profits and sales, an approach which we view as problematic.
Our study builds upon the empirical literature on the impact of public listing or initial public offering (IPO) on firm performance (Roell, 1996) . This literature focuses on developed countries, particularly the United States, and finds that public listing of privately-held companies tends to worsen company performance.
Specifically, Ritter (1991) finds that IPO firms underperform a set of comparable firms matched by size and industry. Laughran and Ritter (1995) find that both IPOs and seasoned equity offerings significantly underperform relative to non-issuing firms for five years after the offering date. Jain and Kini (1994), Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) and Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997) find that the performance of IPO firms-measured by return on assets (ROA) or return on sales (ROS)-declines in the first few years following the offering but do not decline further afterwards.
One explanation for post-listing performance decline is managerial moral hazard resulting from reduced ownership stakes by management after listing (Jain and Kini, 1994; Holthausen and Larcker, 1996) . Another explanation is that the pre-listing performance may be exaggerated (Laughran and Ritter, 1995; Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998) . For example, offering firms may window-dress their accounting figures prior to going public. They may also time the offerings to coincide with periods of unusually good performance or favorable market valuations. Consequently, the over-stated pre-IPO performance may result in a superficial decline in post-IPO performance.
Our study is also related to the literature on share issue privatization, which refers to using public listing as a way of divesting the government's ownership in SOEs (Megginson and Netter, 2001 In the following section, we provide some background information on public listings and the development of the stock market in China. Section 3 describes the data and presents some preliminary results comparing the sample firms' financial outcomes and ownership structures before and after public listing. Main findings from regression analyses are reported in Section 4. The last section concludes.
Public Listings in China
China's stock market was officially established in 1990 when eight firms first went public in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE). In the following year, Shenzhen
Stock Exchange (SZSE) was also established. The following decade witnessed phenomenal growth in China's stock market, as outlined in Table 1 .
(Insert Table 1 (Tian, 2000; Berkman, Cole and Fu, 2002; Sun and Tong, 2003) . We thus will let the empirics tell us whether legal-person ownership entails consequences different from state ownership.
Before 2001, the question of whether a Chinese company could make an IPO was determined largely by an administrative process rather than the market process seen in developed economies. When an SOE wants to go public, it must seek permission from the local government or/and its affiliated central government ministries, which receive an IPO quota from the CSRC. 4 Under such a quota system, how many and which firms go public each year depends not only on the quality of the firm and on macroeconomic conditions, but also on the availability and distribution of the quota. All firms in our sample went public under the quota system.
Data and Preliminary Findings

Data and Variables
The data for this study is a panel of accounting and ownership data of all companies listed on the SHSE or SZSE. A novel feature of our data set is that it contains pre-listing information, which allows us to compare companies' pre-and post-listing performance. 6 Another feature of the data set is that it is free of survival bias that may cause problems in studying listing effects on company performance. No firm in our data set ceased operations or was de-listed after going public. Although China's bankruptcy law was passed in 1986, listed companies can usually count on the government or state-owned banks to bail them out of financial difficulties and hence avoid bankruptcy. Also no publicly listed firms returned to private ownership in our sample period. Only in 2001 did we observe the first incidence of de-listing.
In our regression analyses, we follow the existing literature in choosing our dependent and explanatory variables. This allows us to highlight the similarities as well as differences in the effects of public listing in China in comparison with countries that have been previously examined in the literature. Definitions of variables are listed in Table 2 .
6 IPO firms are required by law to provide three years of audited accounting data prior to listing.
However, since the CSRC was established in 1992, two years after the first stock exchange was established, and major disclosure rules were only issued in 1993 but were not immediately strictly enforced, the disclosure standard was not consistent during the first half of 1990s. As a result, about 20% of firms in our sample did not produce complete three-year pre-listing data.
(Insert Table 2 here)
To minimize the possibility of a small number of outliers driving the results, we follow other authors in the literature and Winsorize the data. Specifically, we reset the value of a variable that is in the tail one percentile of the full sample to that of the 1 st percentile and the 99 th percentile respectively.
Financial Outcomes and Ownership Structures before and after Listing
We report in Table 3 the summary statistics of the financial outcomes and ownership structures for both the full sample (column 3) and the sub-samples of the pre-listing years (column 4) and post-listing years (column 5). These are calculated using all observations that will be used in at least one of the subsequent regressions.
Note that the post-listing statistics include observations from the IPO years.
(Insert Table 3 here)
The average size of the listed firms, measured by either the book value of assets (denoted as asset) or sales (sales), is quite large, with the average value of assets at RMB1,179 million and average sales at RMB703 million. Public listing significantly increases a firm's assets: the post-listing average asset size is almost However, the operating performance of listed firms as measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) deteriorates considerably after public listing.
The average ROA in the post-listing periods drops to almost a third of the level before listing, from 0.153 or 15.3% to 0.057 or 5.7%. The average ROS drops after listing by almost a half, from 0.191 to 0.101.
Since many factors, such as macroeconomic factors during the sample period, could play a role in the decline of firm performance, in the next section we use regression analyses to examine how operating performance and other financial outcomes are affected by public listing once additional factors are controlled for.
Regression Analysis
Methodology
The basic regression we use to measure the effects of going public is the following:
Our dependent variables include a number of financial outcome measures. We use ROA as the overall performance measure. Because IPO firms often experience a rapid expansion in their asset base, and this alone can be responsible for the drop in ROA, we also examine ROS, another conventional measure of operating performance, to check the robustness of what we may find about the changes in ROA.
Since a primary objective of public listing is to raise equity capital as the external source of investment for business expansion, we also include financial leverage (debt), investment rate (ln_capex) and sales growth (salegrow) as measures of the outcomes of public listing in our investigation.
On the right-hand side, is L is the dummy variable that is 1 when firm i at year t is in the s th year after going public and zero otherwise. Note that we use the subscript s to denote the age of listing and the subscript t to denote the calendar year. Thus our specification allows both listing age-specific effects and calendar year-specific effects. 8 Our specification also includes fixed effects to control for firm heterogeneity.
This allows us to interpret the listing effects on an outcome measure as the difference between its levels at particular listing ages and the pre-listing level. 9 We also control for variables that are the "usual suspects" in explaining the outcomes regardless of whether a firm is listed or not (as in Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998) . We use the variable log(lagged sales) to capture the size effect, i.e. larger firms may exert more market power and therefore generate more profits, and log(lagged leverage ratio) to control for financial structure and its informational content.
10
It should be noted that the calendar-year effect in the above specification is identified by the average effect for the listed firms at the particular calendar year net of those explained by listing-age dummies and other explanatory variables. Our sample period of 1994 to 2000 coincides with a period of massive deterioration of financial performance of the state sector across the board. When the dependent variable is ROA or ROS, the year dummies are intended to capture the effect of economy-wide factors on firm performance. However, such an approach is less than 8 If all the firms went public in the same year, it would be impossible to distinguish the listing-age effects and changes in macroeconomic trends. But our firms went public in different years, as shown in Table 1 .
9 Some may find it surprising that using fixed effects implies being able to use the pre-listing level as a benchmark, since typically the operation of fixed effects is to subtract the firm-level mean from each regression. But the inference is valid once one realizes that one can subtract an observation of any period (say, the pre-listing period, s = -1) to get rid of the fixed effects and obtain a consistent estimate of Equation (1). 10 We also tried adding more variables such as the share of intangibles in total assets and investment rate (both lagged by one period) as additional explanatory variables, and we obtained qualitatively similar results. However, in doing so we lost a significant number of observations. satisfactory. To the extent that listed firms differ from typical SOEs, the calendar-year effects may merely reflect macro effects common only to listed firms but not to a random SOE. Thus a more satisfactory way of filtering out the macro shocks is, in place of year dummies, to control directly for the average values of ROA and ROS for the SOE sector. Since we are primarily interested in the listing effects relative to a typical SOE, the national SOE average is a more proper benchmark against which listed companies are compared.
We use data from the Chinese Statistical Yearbooks to calculate the average ROA and ROS of all the industrial SOEs, denoted as ROA_national and ROS_national respectively. Once the national average of firm performance is controlled for, the listing-age effect for post-listing year s can be characterized as
In this we first obtain the difference between firm performance and the national average in post-listing year s, subtract the difference between firm performance and the national average in pre-listing year -1, and then filter out the influence of other explanatory variables. This is similar to the difference-in-difference approach that is often used in recent empirical applications in the panel setup.
Since our benchmark is the performance of the pre-listing years, the sample used for the regression consists only of firms with data for at least one pre-listing year. If a firm has more than one year of pre-listing data, then the benchmark is the average of the values for all the pre-listing years.
It is perhaps useful to explain here why we do not adopt the matching approach to identify the listing effects. With such an approach, a matched sample would be found for the sample of listed firms, and the listing effects would then be computed as the before-after difference for the listed sample subtracting the before-after difference for the matched sample. Matching is usually done through the closest match based on size-industry category (e.g., Zingales, 1996 and 1998) . Matching, however, poses serious data requirements. The researchers need to have access to another, much larger, data set in which important characteristics of the sample firms-most often performance, size, and industry-are close to those of the listed firms. Poor matching would result in mis-specified test statistics and biased estimates (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997 and 1998). It is difficult, if not impossible, to find reasonably good matches for these listed companies, which are overwhelmingly large firms. To our best knowledge, there is no Chinese data set available that contains enough useful information on large enterprises between 1994 and 2000. 11 11 When revising the paper for this journal, we examined a few potentially useful data sets but concluded they were not good enough. For instance, we looked at a survey data set that covers roughly 400 SOEs for the period between 1994 and 1999, which is partly sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS). Its predecessors, covering the periods from 1980-1989 and 1990-1994 , have been used by previous researchers (Groves et al., 1994; Li, 1997; Xu, 2000; Shirley and Xu, 2001; Cull and Xu, 2000) . However, the size of the firms in the CASS data set is a lot smaller than that of listed firms: the asset size is on average only 1/7 of the listed sample. More importantly, the CASS sample suffers from significant survival bias-the SOEs were those that had survived for at least 20 years! Not surprisingly, when we plot the average ROA for the sample, it has a significant rising trend, in sharp contrast with the significant declining trend in the listed sample. Since we know that the national average for the state sector shows a declining trend, the CASS sample is clearly not a good benchmark for comparison with listed firms. We also looked at other samples for Chinese firms such as the Chinese industrial censuses, and found that these have too little information for our purposes.
Effects of Public Listing
A primary objective of public listing is to raise capital for SOEs, which normally rely on bank loans as their only source of external finance. Indeed, one of the most-cited reasons for public listing in developed economies is that it loosens the financial constraints faced by firms and facilitates business expansion (Roell, 1996; Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998) . To shed light on this point, we look at the listing age patterns of the investment rate (measured by the level of capital expenditure), the financial leverage and the growth of sales. Column (1) of Table 4 shows that the log of the level of capital expenditure increases significantly in the year of listing, although one year later it goes back to the pre-listing level and then declines somewhat several years after listing. Column (2) shows that public listing leads to a significant reduction in the debt-asset ratio for a few years, after which the debt level returns to the pre-listing level. Column (3) shows that listed firms are able to maintain their high pre-listing sales growth rate through all the observed post-listing years.
These findings suggest that using public listing as a means to raise equity capital as an external source of investment for SOEs has, at least in part, achieved its goal.
(Insert Table 4 here) Public listing as a reform measure is motivated by and also aimed at stopping the deterioration of financial performance in the state sector. The evidence, however, shows that public listing does not improve SOEs' bottom lines. On the contrary, SOE listing is associated with a significant drop in operating performance measured by ROA (Column 4 of Table 4 ). The listing-age effects are: -6.1% in the listing year, -7.8% in post-listing year 1, -8.3% in post-listing year 2, -10.4% in year 3, -10.5% in year 4, and -12.2 in years 5 and 6. 12 In other words, the overall operating performance of China's listed firms is significantly lower than the pre-listing level, and performance declines in the years following the listing.
The decline in performance cannot simply be attributed to the increase in the size of assets. As total assets normally increase significantly after an IPO, operating income scaled by assets has a downward bias. However, operating income scaled by sales (i.e., ROS) also shows a similar decline after listing. Column (5) of Table 4 shows that the listing effects on ROS from the listing year to the 5 th /6 th year after listing are, -2.4%, -6.3%, -8.8%, -10.7%, -13.7% and -13.1%, respectively. Note that the negative effects of public listing on ROA and ROS are very precisely estimated.
The above finding suggests that performance decline after an IPO may be a general pattern for firms going public-a finding which applies to Western firms as well as to Chinese firms. In the Chinese case, a number of reasons could be responsible for the deterioration of accounting profits. One reason, which also applies to Western firms, can be found in the overstatement of the pre-listing performance through timing the issuing or window-dressing accounting figures prior to listing (i.e., financial packaging). In a study of 81 listed Chinese firms that issued shares to foreigners, Aharony, Lee and Wong (2000) suggest that the post-listing decline in financial performance may be due to financial packaging before the IPO through, for example, earnings management. 13 According to these authors, a principal means of 12 We bundle the fifth and sixth year together because there are relatively few observations for each year.
13 See Aharoni, Lee and Wong (2000) Table 4 .
Therefore, we conclude that financial packaging through earnings management plays only a minor role in explaining post-listing performance decline. The fact that it AR ∆ is statistically significant in the ROS regression (and later regressions in Table 6) suggests that it does play a role.
(Insert Table 5 here)
As mentioned earlier, another common explanation for IPO's performance decline in the Western context is the increase in agency costs due to reduced ownership stakes by management after public listing. In the Chinese case, public listing reduces state ownership and generally increases managerial autonomy. It may potentially reduce the cost of political control of firms but increase agency costs (Qian, 1996) . The net impact of these two opposing effects on performance is unclear.
However, due to a weak legal system, a strong case can be made for the expropriation of interests of minority owners by the large shareholders who dominate the management and operations of the listed firms. In most IPO cases, selected profitable business units of an SOE are carved out and they form an independent entity for public listing. The original SOE becomes the parent company and retains most, if not all, unprofitable units and liabilities as well as the least productive workforce. This arrangement sharply increases the operating pressure on the parent SOE, which may use its power to divert revenues from the listed firms through, for example, related transactions, leading to a decline in the latter's profits. We do not have evidence for the above hypothesis, though it is plausible. Future research is needed to shed light on it. If expropriation by parent companies is indeed very serious, then the performance decline of listed firms may not be attributed to the listing event per se, but to poor corporate governance and the incomplete nature of the SOE reforms.
In any case, regardless of what causes firm performance to decline after listing, it is apparent that public listing has failed to turn loss-making SOEs into profit-making companies. This finding is also consistent with the possibility that the government or the issuing SOEs simply use the stock market to raise money for SOEs while having no intention of privatizing them, and the firms are still controlled by the state given the fact that state owners have yet to relinquish their dominant positions in the listed firms.
Ownership Structure and Post-listing Performance
Our discussions in the introduction and previous sections lead us to consider the role played by ownership in the performance of listed companies. We focus on the post-listing periods in this subsection for a number of reasons. First, the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in transitional economies is an interesting research topic (e.g., Claessens and Djankov, 1999; Cull, Matesova and Shirley, 2001 ). Second, pre-listing performance may be contaminated by financial packaging effects. Lastly, a significant number of firms miss ownership information in pre-listing years.
We observed earlier that public listing changes the ownership structure of a firm and that, for most listed firms in China, the majority of shares is held by the state is controlled for so that any carryover of financial packaging effects is held constant. The results are reported in Table 6 .
(Insert Table 6 here) 14 Our interpretation of the result is that an ownership structure that features more balances of power among top owners introduces checks and balances in the control structure and hence reduces the likelihood of a dominant shareholder maximizing his or her own private interest at the expense of other shareholders (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000) . Our test of the effect of the balance of power on firm performance is, to our knowledge, the first in the literature.
Conclusion
In this paper, we use a panel of pre-and post-listing data of all publicly listed companies in China between 1994 and 2000 to explore the effectiveness of public listing as a means of reforming SOEs in China. We find that public listing has had some intended impact on firms' ownership structure and finance. However, listed firms also experience a sharp deterioration in accounting profits, which may be 14 As a lower Herfindahl concentration index may be associated with a lower level of state ownership, our result could be due to the negative impact of state ownership if it were not controlled for.
attributable to one or both of pre-listing window-dressing of accounting figures and post-listing expropriation by the parent SOEs.
We also find some statistical relations between ownership and firm performance. State and legal-person ownership are indistinguishable whereas domestic private ownership is inferior in terms of its impact on performance. The degree of ownership concentration by a few large shareholders is positively correlated with operating performance, but a more balanced ownership structure among these top shareholders is found to be good for performance. This latter finding suggests that under a weak legal and regulatory system, having a few large shareholders on a relatively equal footing may improve corporate governance and prevent misbehavior by a dominant shareholder.
The empirical evidence we have does not allow us to make a conclusive judgment on the overall success (or failure) of public listing as a means of reforming SOEs. Given the short history of China's stock market, it may be too early to make such a judgment. As the stock market, legal systems and other market institutions in China develop over time and as more private entrepreneurs accumulate sufficient wealth to acquire more stakes and become large shareholders in listed firms, it is conceivable that public listing can become a useful means in transforming SOEs and improving their performance. It would be very interesting to see if corporatization in general and public listing in particular is simply a transitional phenomenon or a viable alternative to privatization in the long run. 
A5
Shares held by top five shareholders divided by total number of shares.
Herfindahl_top5
Herfindahl index of ownership concentration among top five shareholders.
Calculated as ∑ 2 i S , where S i is the ratio of shares held by the i th shareholder to total shares held by all top five shareholders.
∆AR
Credit sales/net cash sales in year t -credit sales/net cash sales in year before the IPO. "Credit sales" is the change in accounts receivable from the previous year. "Net cash sales" is revenue minus credit sales. Note. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. The coefficients for year dummies are not reported. ∆AR measures how much credit sales as a percentage of net cash sales differ from that in the year right before IPO. By definition, ∆AR = 0 for the year right before the IPO, and that year's data are excluded from the analysis. Note: The sample includes only post-listing years. Unlike the previous analysis, we do not require pre-listing data in this analysis, which is why more firms are included in this table.
